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Party Politics and the Poor: A Research Note
Roger A. Lohmann1

Why is it that some states make payments to public welfare recipients that are
at least twice as large as those paid to recipients in some other states? On its face,
the arbitrary unfairness of such conditions seems obvious yet little is being done to
address the matter.
Various explanations for this phenomenon have been advanced. One of the most
widely held among political scientists is that the size of such payments reflect the
different welfare orientations of the states – a political cultural explanation – and
that these welfare orientations in turn are at least partly the result of differential
levels of competition among and within political parties in each state. This
explanation, first advanced in 1949, has recently been the subject of a great deal of
controversy as well as a considerable outpouring of research by political scientists
over the past two decades, and also a fair amount of criticism. Following up on the
consequences of a statistical re-examination of this relationship for the fifty states
by Dawson and Robinson (1963) more than half a dozen investigators have weighed
in on the subject. They found a statistically significant relationship between party
competition and welfare orientation but the effect disappeared when per capita
income was controlled. This result was confirmed by Hofferbert (1966), who found
no independent effects for any of the political variables he examined. Despite it’s
obvious implications for public welfare practice and policy, social work researchers
have ignored this research completely.
The general trend of findings suggests rejecting any relationship between these
two variables, and yet general unwillingness to do so has been grounded both in
disciplinary and methodological concerns. In general, the effect of these studies has
simply been to obscure the relationship and to render any possible conclusions
indeterminate and to call for further needed research.

Political Parties and Poverty
The focus of this paper is explicitly interdisciplinary. It is directed at researchers
interested in questions of social policy, public welfare practice, state government,
and American political parties. Even though the research mentioned above, and the
renaissance of interest in state politics it is part of, has been conducted within a
single discipline – political science – resolution of the issues raised has implications
for a much broader interdisciplinary audience. While research in other disciplines,
including sociology, anthropology and economics also could be brought to bear, the
principal focus here will be limited to research in political science and “macro” social
work – specifically social policy and social planning.
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The paper is an appeal for interdisciplinary, or short of that, multi-disciplinary
inquiry on questions of the contemporary relationship between American political
parties and the poor. I will attempt to demonstrate that a number of fruitful
avenues of inquiry have been suggested and opened in the past but are presently
subject to appropriate skepticism due to certain methodological and procedural
weaknesses – some of them stemming from the use of statistical procedures
requiring large and random samples on a universe of fifty cases.
More definitive investigation of many of the underlying questions will be called
for as a prelude to seeking viable alternatives for reforming the public welfare
system.2 Opportunities for reform through the much vaunted – and much maligned
– two party system are only a backdrop for the paper. The central focus here is on
the social scientific question of the empirical relationships between political parties
and poor people in our social world and specifically on the role of public welfare as
one such linkage.

Problem
Following the “rediscovery” of poverty in the Kennedy years (1960-1963) and the
initiation of the Johnson-era (1968-1968) War on Poverty (Kramer, 1969; Moynihan,
1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969; Spergel, 1972), there has been much recent
interest in the social sciences on the question of the relationship between poverty
and politics in American society. Although social workers and political scientists
have, perhaps, the largest professional audiences on the subject, sociologists,
anthropologists, economists, social psychologists and others from the liberal arts
have also demonstrated interest in these questions at one point or another in recent
years. Moreover, the issue has traversed the bounds of the conventional post-New
Deal dialogues as both of America’s political parties have entered into the debate,
along with activist reform groups like the National Welfare Rights Organization
and professional trade associations including the American Medical Association, the
American Bar Association and the National Association of Social Workers. During
the past decade the question of politics and the poor has been largely dominated by
national perspectives and Congressional proposals.
Yet, several things stand out about the emerging consensus on welfare reform.
First, it has focused almost exclusively on two levels of American government: the
federal government and cities; leaving a third, and equally important – the states –
entirely excluded. Secondly, there appears at times to be something approaching
universal agreement – at least among the academic specialists involved – that the
present welfare system is substantively and morally bankrupt and can only be
2
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replaced (Piven & Cloward, 1971). Thirdly, there is a kind of pious non-partisanship
to all of these discussions that suggests (quite falsely, it turned out) that the issue of
the poor transcends politics.
The approach taken here is at variance with these points of apparent consensus.
First, the focus is exclusively on the state level of government, politics and policy.
Second, with the defeat of Nixonian proposals for welfare reform – specifically a
national guaranteed annual income – it appears that the present public welfare
system – including the newly established SSI program, which somehow escaped
through that defeat – will be with us for the foreseeable future. Based on recent
experience, we can assume that public welfare in our society is a profoundly
political issue and one about which there is very little genuine consensus.3
Today, just as a decade ago, when renewed interest in poverty arose, the single
most important issue in a problem-ridden public welfare system is the generally,
but inconsistently, low levels of payments to recipients in the majority of states. It
is not accurate to assume that payments to all welfare recipients in all states are
uniformly deficient. In fact, the second most important problem from a systematic
standpoint is the enormous variability in payment levels. This variability was a
principal rationale for the 1972 amendments creating the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program, which is a uniform, nationally administered program of the
Social Security Administration established to replace the categorial state programs
for the Aged, Blind and Disabled. However, the variability still remains for the most
controversial Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and there is
growing evidence that variability continues to be an issue both in state-supplements
of SSI and in the Medicaid program.
The principal implications of this are as simple as they are profound: If, in fact,
recipients in one state receive on average less than half of what recipients in some
other state receive and the difference is not related to cost-of-living differences
between those states, is there not a strong case that citizens are being treated
differently by their government in violation of the equal protection clause of the
U.S. Constitution? The political challenge is whether the general will exists to face
up to these challenges. Although there are major legal and constitutional issues
involved here, equally important is the empirical question of the political cause(s) to
which these systematic differences can be attributed. Since it is a causal connection
that is sought, we might initially set forth the parameters of that term as it is
usually employed in the social sciences. First, in order for any factor we seek to
attribute as causal to be plausible, it must precede in time the factor which it
explains. Secondly, there must be a real, discernable (that is, meaningful)
relationship between any cause and its effect.
The contemporary explanations of this phenomenon in the published literature
can be divided into two broad categories. Both of these are causal explanations
3
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grounded in statistical correlations. On the one hand, there are the social order
explanations that identify some differentiating characteristics of the social orders of
sub-national jurisdictions – states or localities – as the causal factor accounting for
the differentials in welfare payments. The other are the social organization
explanations, which identify some characteristic s of the organizations, associations
or groups to which persons in the various jurisdictions may belong as causal factors.
An example of the first is the commonly held urbanization-industrialization
orientation which links higher levels of welfare orientation to industrial cities, and
lower levels to agricultural and rural areas. The second is associated with the
approach under consideration here: the inter-party competition hypothesis. Where
parties (or factions within parties) are more competitive, welfare orientations will
be higher, and where they are less competitive they will be lower.
It must be noted here that the issue has too often been approached as an eitheror proposition in which social order explanations are pitted directly against social
organization explanations. However, the evidence offered by any of the
investigations to the present is not sufficiently convincing in one direction or the
other, and further there are serious methodological implications involved in such a
head to head comparison. One of the possibilities that deserves more attention than
it has received is a multi-variate model in which both social order and social
explanations contribute jointly to a composite impact on welfare orientations.

The Party Competition Hypothesis
One of the earliest formulation of the causes of variations in welfare payments
was outlined by the late political scientist V.O. Key Jr., in his class study of
Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949). Two decades later Cnudde & McCrone
summarized Key’s initial argument thus:
Key sees the degree of party competition as crucial because it reflects the the
extent to which politics is organized or unorganized. Party competition, by
producing some semblance of an organized politics lessens the difficulty of
lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, thereby
enabling them to promote their own interests more effectively…” (Cnudde &
McCrone, 1969)
Several implicit assumptions and apparent assertions of Key’s approach are
worth noting. First is the use of party competition of an indicator, or index of the
level of political organization in a state. Secondly, there would appear to be an
assumption that the poor everywhere seem to adequately promote their own
interest politically and that this is, in some manner, directly responsible for more
satisfactory welfare payment levels in some instances. This assumption is
seemingly contradicted by lower rates of voting and political participation
individually and in associations.
This assumption has a good deal in common with pluralist approaches to power
elites and with “modal voter” arguments. The assumption that all citizens in a
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democracy have pretty much the same ability to affect policy outcomes has been
seriously challenged by a range of studies by C. Wright Mills and others (Mills,
1963).
Further, Key’s approach fails to systematically account for (or dismiss) a range
of social order variables that have been shown to be relevant in other studies (C.f.,
Dye, 1966; Piven & Cloward, 1971; Wilensky & LeBeaux, 1965). In particular, two
social order explanations are not sufficiently explored or discounted: the role of
federalism; and the political economies of individual states. Focus on party
competition as a determinative factor also seems to discount rival hypotheses of
political organization; specifically, the role of interest groups and public
bureaucracies. All state welfare departments cannot be assumed to be equal in the
defense and advocacy of the programs before legislative bodies and in budget
negotiations with their respective governors’ offices, for example.
In addition, the Key approach demonstrates certain measurement weaknesses.
Statistically, the resultant models fail to satisfactorily control for possible spurious
correlations. There is also a heavy reliance on standard, social indicator-type data.
The central premise of the Key approach seems to be that in situations of
political competition, state politicians will seek the support of the poor by promising
and then delivering higher welfare payments. In general, this premise lacks face
validity and it is difficult to identify state-level examples where this has occurred or
is occurring. It is far more likely that such discussions and debates have and will
continue to occur among political elites and that any influence of party competition
will be mediated through competition among those elites.

Conclusion
The issue of the causes of the extreme variations that exist among the American
states in the levels of welfare payments is obviously a very important one. It is also
clear that no satisfactory explanations – not the interparty competition thesis nor
the various social order explanations adequately explain these variations. What is
needed is a model of a multi-variate explanations which combines both social order
and social organization variables into a more comprehensive account.
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